Exercise modified (E. Czarny, E. Nojszewska, Mikroekonomia – zbiór zadań). The utility function of Barnaba is given as follows: U(x,y) = 8xy additional workouts in Polish: Czarny, E., E. Nojszewska, , ” Mikroekonomia: zbiór zadań”, PWE. additional workouts in Polish: Laidler, D. additional workouts in Polish: Czarny, E., E. Nojszewska, , ” Mikroekonomia: zbiór zadań”, PWE. additional workouts in Polish: Laidler, D., S. Estrin,

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A conclusion is drawn from the interdependence theory that conscious parallelism of decisions on prices and production quotas should not be treated as collusion and, consequently, as an illegal action subject to competition law enforcement Counteracting cartels in the decisions of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumers Protection The majority of the decisions of the Polish UOKiK, known as the Antimonopoly Office betweenconcerns the preventive monitoring of concentrations and a small percentage relates to cartels anti-competitive horizontal agreements.

Economic Approach to Counteracting Cartels

Mikroekonomia, PWE, Warszawa 3. Additional information registration calendar, class conductors, localization and schedules of classesmight be available czarmy the USOSweb system: If the analysis of pricing policy and of the optimization of distributional logistics indicates that it was impossible to establish the existence of a cartel regulating these areas, then the presumption on fixing production quotas would be illogical.

It is doubtful whether a convergence of market actions of competitors may at all be defined as collusion, even a tacit one. Establishing the existence of cartel facilitating factors is considered to be the purpose of the relevant market analysis which requires the economic approach to determine: Restricting market power resulting from a dominant position or cartel requires state intervention.


Mentioned here should be however the administrative weaknesses formulated by J. Understanding how the market operates and what factors determine the behavior of consumer and producers. The final test, organized during the exam period, will be a written multiple-choice test five answers proposed to each question, only one is correct. In the President of UOKiK published additional guidelines explaining the goals and application procedure of the programme.

Fall semester 2011/2012

It is also important that the organisation of a cartel is more time and cost efficient than building a dominant position by a company in its own relevant market The theory of general and the optimum 5.

It is hard to imagine that entrepreneurs would assess external losses associated with their practices and include them in their own cost-benefit analysis as applied, for instance, in the case of environmental charges. Information about fuel prices at gas stations is public and displayed on pylons easily seen from a distance.

All participants of the course are allowed to take the retake test, regardless of the result from the first approach.

Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies. A limited number of producers operating on an oligopolistic market translates into a relative ease of obtaining information about the relevant competitors.

The European cement cartel, which operated for ten years with the support of the European Association of Cement Producers Cembureaueight national associations and 33 cement manufacturers, constitutes a good example of a precise organisation and stability of a cartel. You are not logged in log in. Role of economic analysis in anti-cartel proceedings IV.

Theory and Practice, Cambridge Competition law finds justification in microeconomic theory, and not only in the concept of social deadweight loss4, but also in the concept explaining the essence, reasons and ways to minimize market failures5.


Which methods make it possible to differentiate cartels from competition in oligopolistic markets including economic and econometric analyses? Whish, Competition Law, London, Edinburghp. This paradigm, also known to organisation and management theory, leads to the conclusion that companies operate within the limits set by market structure Economic dimension of cartels II.

Probability of cartel formation is low on unfavourable markets however its analysis requires statistical data and information concerning czagny market under examination. The explanation of this phenomenon may be found in the concept of co-opetition, according to which entrepreneurs are willing and should co-operate in the process of added value creation, while they should compete in the process of added value distribution in the relevant market Principle and Execution, Harvard Are market processes that indicate collusion not more important than the agreement itself if it was never implemented?

Calaméo – Economic Approach to Counteracting Cartels

Whish, Competition Law, p. For example, Herbert Hovenkamp states that the application of competition law is necessary if administrative intervention into market processes is economically nojszeqska. Kelly Publishers, USA Why are these agreements subject to the highest fines and, in some countries USA, Canada, Mexico, UKsubject to both fines as well as imprisonment?